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IT’S THE SECONDARY 
TERM - DO YOU KNOW 
WHERE YOUR LEASE IS?
Charles C. Steincamp
IT’S THE SECONDARY TERM -
DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOUR LEASE IS?
Oil and gas leases have been structured since time immemorial into a primary or fixed 
term followed by a secondary term that is dependent on the conduct o f the lessee for its duration. 
The lessee must either produce oil or gas from the lease or fit within one o f the various “excuse” 
clauses contained in the lease.
During the secondary term of a standard oil and gas lease the lessee is operating under the 
portion o f the lease known as the habendum clause. This paper will focus on the issues 
surrounding operations in the secondary term.
Habendum Clause
The habendum clause contained in the common forms of oil and gas leases are all drafted 
as a special limitation on the grant.1 The lease lasts during the primary term and “as long
1 Haby v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955); Dethloff v. 
Zeigler Coal Company, 412 N.E. 2d 526 (111. 1980), cert, denied 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Noel 
Estates, Inc. v. Murray, 65 S. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Peckham v. Dunning, 125 NYS 2d 895 (NY 
Sup. Ct. 1953); Hannah v. Shorts, 125 N.E. 2d 338 (Oh. 1955); Brown v. Haight, 255 A.2d 508 
(Pa. 1969); Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W. 2d 783 (Tx. 1941); McCullough Oil Inc. v. Rezek, 346 
S.E. 2d 788 (W.Va. 1986); Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 604 P. 2d 854 (Ok. 1979); 
Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Larson, 553 P.2d 885 (Kan. 1976); Reynolds v. McNeill, 236 S.W. 2d 
723 (Ar. 1951); Turner v. Reynolds Metal Company, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (Ar. 1986).
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thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, is produced . . .  .2
This limitation means that the lessee is not required to do anything, however, if  he fails to 
satisfy the terms of the lease it will terminate under its own terms. This automatic termination 
puts the burden on the lessee to be diligent in his efforts to maintain his lease.
Paving Quantities
Even though not written into the lease, Courts in almost every producing state engraft 
upon the requirement of production in the habendum clause a further requirement that the 
production be “paying quantities.”3 Courts have developed two approaches to determine whether 
a well is in fact producing “paying quantities.” Under the arithmetic test the question becomes 
when viewed objectively “will the lease produce a profit, however small, over operating 
expenses after eliminating the initial costs of drilling and equipping the well or wells on the lease 
which are required to prepare the lease for production.”4 If the lease does not produce “paying 
quantities” based on this objective test then the lease expires under its own terms. The second 
test is known as the prudent operator test. In using that test, Courts first perform an objective
2 Producers 88 1- 43B Oil and Gas Lease Form.
3 Turner v. Reynolds Metal Company, 721 S.W. 2d 626 (Ark. 1986); Barnard v. Gibson, 
224 P.2d 90 (Ca. 1950); Adolf v. Stearns, 64 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1984); Cumberland Contracting 
Company v. Coffey, 405 S.W. 2d 553 (Kt 1966); Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Company v. 
Michigan National Bank, 3024 N.W. 2d 541 (1982); Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Ok. 1954); 
Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (Tx. 1942); LSA-R.S. 31:124(La. Civil Code requiring the 
same).
4 Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P. 2d 1342 (Ks. App. 1982); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (T: 
1942); Superior Oil Company v. Devon Corporation, 458 F. Supp. 1063 (D.Ne. 1978); Gypsy 0  
Company v. Marsh, 248 P. 329 (Ok. 1926).
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analysis o f whether the lease is in fact producing in paying quantities over expenses, then, only in 
the event it is not, the court turns to whether a prudent operator would continue to produce the 
well in spite o f the fact that it is not producing in commercial quantities. The leading case 
concerning the prudent operator test is the case of Clifton v. Koontz.5 The Texas court in that 
case stated “in determining paying quantities, in accordance with the above standard, the trial 
court necessarily must take into consideration all matters which would influence a reasonable and 
prudent operator. Some of these factors are: the depletion of the reservoir and the price for 
which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative profitableness of other wells in the area, 
the operating and marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease provisions, a reasonable 
period of time under the circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is holding the lease merely 
for speculative purposes.” This formulation has been adopted by a number of courts.6
Accounting
However, even in jurisdictions that have strictly adopted the objective test there are still a 
host of issues concerning the application of that test. The typical rule with regard to includible 
expenses is that includible costs include all direct costs encountered whether paid or accrued in 
operating the lease as a prudent operator. These direct costs include labor, trucking, 
transportation expenses, replacement and repair of equipment, taxes, license and permit fees, 
operator’s time on the lease, maintenance and repair of roads, entrances and gates, and expenses
3
5 Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tx. 1959).
6 Webb v. Hardage Corporation, 471 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Michigan 
Wisconsin Pipeline Company v. Michigan National Bank, 324 N.W. 2d 541 (Mi. 1982); Barby v. 
Singer, 648 P.2d 14 (Ok. 1982).
encountered in compliance with state laws which require the plugging o f abandoned wells in 
prevention of pollution.7 In addition to direct costs there are still questions concerning inclusions 
of more indirect costs. One of these items is the overhead costs of the operator.8 Courts have 
taken divergent views concerning inclusion of overhead. Another item of dispute is depreciation. 
Some courts hold that depreciation should be included as an operating expense.9 However, the 
general rule is that depreciation should not be considered as an expense in determining the 
profitableness o f production to the extent that depreciation relates to the initial investment of 
drilling the well.10 However, there are some courts that have distinguished between depreciation 
o f the original investment and depreciation of the production equipment.11
A further difficulty in the paying quantities determination is the appropriate accounting 
period to be used in making the paying quantities determination. Most courts have held that a 
reasonable period o f time should be used to determine whether the well is producing in paying 
quantities. The determination of a reasonable period o f time typically results in the application in
7 Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885 (Ka. 1976); Ross Explorations, Inc. v. 
Freedom Energy, Inc., 8 S.W. 3d 511 (Ar. 2000); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509 (Tx. 1942).
8 Compare and contrast Shelly Oil Company v. Archer, 356 S.W. 2d 774 (Tx. 1961), 
(Items of overhead charges which can be traceable to the actual expense of production should be 
considered.); United Central Oil Corporation v. Helm, 11 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1926), (Overhead 
charges should be considered.); Mason v. Ladd Petroleum Corporation, 630 P.2d 1283 (Ok. 
1981), (Administrative overhead and district expenses should not be considered.)
9 Transport Oil Company v. Exeter Oil Company, 191 P.2d 129 (Ca. 1948).
10 Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W. 2d 684 (Tx. 1959). Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom 
Energy, Inc., 8 S.W. 3d 511 (Ar. 2000); Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844 (Ka. 1980).
11 Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc., 283 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1960); Stewart v. Amerada Hess 
Corporation, 604 P. 2d 854 (Ok. 1979).
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practice if  not by admission o f the court of the prudent operator test.12
Other Excuses 
Operations Clause
Some habendum clauses refer to various operations on the premises as an alternative 
means o f extending the life of the lease. Typically such clauses are appended to the end o f the 
habendum clause. A common lease form provides . .  or the premises are being developed or 
operated.”13 Courts have generally given these clauses effect by applying a prudent operator type 
standard. Where operations are conducted diligently and in good faith Courts have typically 
upheld the lease.14
Dry Hole Clause
The issues involved in the dry hole clause are first the determination as to whether the dry 
hole clause operates into the secondary term or whether it is limited by its terms to the primary
12 Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844 (Ka. 1980), (“The better rule precludes the use of a 
rigid fixed term for determination of profitability and uses a reasonable time depending upon the 
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration sufficient time to reflect the current 
production status o f the lease and thus to provide the information which a prudent operator 
would take into account in whether to continue or to abandon the operation.”); Clifton v. Koontz, 
305 S.W. 2d 782 (Tx. Civ. App. 1957); Transport Oil Company v. Exeter Oil Company, 191 
P.2d 129 (Ca. 1948).
13 Producers 88 1-43B Oil and Gas Lease Form.
14 Pardue v. Mark, 279 S.W. 2d 594 (Tx. Cir. App. 1955); Prowant v. Sealy, 187 P. 235 
(Okl. 1920); Adolph v. Stearns, 684 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1984).
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term.15 16Some clauses by their terms have been held to extend even into the secondary term. For 
example in the case of Stanoland Oil and Gas Company v. Newman Brothers Drilling 
Company.16 The lease contained the following dry hole provision: “If prior to discovery of oil or 
gas on said land lessee should drill a dry hole or holes thereon . . . this lease shall not terminate if 
lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations within 60 days thereafter, or (if it 
be within the primary term) commences or resumes the payment or tender of rentals. . .”. The 
Texas court held that the lease was preserved by new drilling operations commenced within 60 
days after the completion of a dry hole, even though the dry hole itself was completed after the 
expiration of the primary term. This rule has been followed by several jurisdictions.17
Cessation of Production Clause
Typical cessation of production clauses provide for the commencement of new operations 
within a certain time or for the resumption of rental payments by the lessee if the cessation 
occurs during the primary term. The courts have used the test of whether the cessation is
15 . See Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 89 N.W. 2d 245 (Ne. 1958).
16 Stanoland Oil and Gas Company v. Newman Brothers Drilling Company. 305 S.W. 2d 
169 (Tx. 1957).
17 Harper v. Hudson Gas and Oil Corporation, 189 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. of La. 1960) Aff. 
299 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1962). (Dry hole was completed after the expiration of the primary term 
and within 60 days thereafter a portion of the lease hole was included in a compulsory unit with 
premises on which there was located a producing well.). Owens v. Superior Oil Company, 730 
P.2d 458 (N.M. 1986), (Lease was preserved by pooling the leasehold with other premises and by 
engaging in further drilling off the lease but on the pool deck which resulted in production.); 
Somer v. Harris Trust and Savings Bank, 566 P.2d 775 (Ka. 1977).
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permanent and not merely temporary.18 The kinds of evidence relevant to the question of 
whether the cessation is temporary or permanent typically are (1) the period o f times that the 
cessation has persisted; (2) the intent of the operator; and (3) the cause of the cessation.19 These 
issues tend to devolve into an application of the prudent operator standard.
Shut In Royalty
The operation o f gas wells involves unique considerations due to the nature o f the product 
that are not inherent in the production o f oil. First and foremost, because gas is not amenable to 
transportation other than by pipeline, issues then arise as to the lessee’s ability to maintain an oil 
and gas lease in the event no pipeline is available with which to market his gas. Some states hold 
that discovery of paying quantities of gas is equivalent to “production in paying quantities.” 
These states are West Virginia, Montana, Wyoming and Oklahoma. In these states, a shut in 
royalty clause is not necessary in an oil and gas lease so long as the lessee acts as a prudent 
operator finding market for the production. However, a number of states require marketing of 
gas at the end of the primary term in order to preserve the lease. These states are Texas, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, and Kansas. Some states such as North Dakota and Arkansas have not 
clearly ruled on the issue of whether actual marketing of gas is required to extend the lease 
beyond the primary term.
In the states not requiring marketing in order to extend the lease beyond the primary term,
7
18 KelwoodFarms, Inc. v. Ritchie, 571 P.2d 338 (Ka. 1977).
19 Wrestler v. Colt, 644 P. 2d 1342 (Ks. App. 1982); Reynolds v. McNeill, 236 S.W. 2d 
723 (Ar. 1951); Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W. 2d 783 (Tx. 1941); Amoco Production Company 
v. Braslau, 561 S.W. 2d 805 (Tx. 1978); Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Ok. 1958).
the lease will not terminate as long as the lessee diligently searches for a market. However, in 
those states where marketing is required, failure to pay shut in royalty in a timely manner or to 
market gas will cause the lease to terminate.20 In addition, failure to pay shut in royalty in the 
proper manner will result in lease termination.21 In addition, courts have interpreted shut in 
royalty provisions to be applicable only when there is no market for the gas from a given well. In 
the case of Tucker v. Hugoton Energy Corporation, 855 P.2d 929 (Kan. 1993) a broad form of 
shut in royalty clause did not permit the lessee to shut in production in an effort to negotiate a 
better gas contract with his purchaser and the lease was terminated.
Conclusion
We are all bound by the whims of some long ago lessee that structured oil and gas leases. 
Little has changed since the 1800's in the overall form of the oil and gas lease. As a result o f 
decisions made long ago oil and gas operators must be extremely diligent to either market oil and 
gas in paying quantities or assure themselves that they are within one of the “excuses” in the 
lease. Unfortunately, a new cottage industry has sprung up with the revival of prices seeking to 
cancel oil and gas leases that are in the secondary term.22 So the question is: “It’s the secondary 
term: Do you know where your lease is?”
8
20 Osborne v. Rogers, 261 S.W.2d 311 (Tx. 1953); Pray v. Premier Petroleum, 662 P.2d 
255 (Kan. 1983).
21 Amber Oil and Gas Company v. Bratton, 711 S.W. 2d 741 (Tx. App. 1986), (Lessee 
accidently paid shut in royalty to the wrong party and the lease terminated.)
22 National Gas Pipeline Company v. Pool, 30 S.W. 3d 618 (Tx. App. 2000), (1937 lease 
held by production, two new wells drilled in 1996, suit filed 1998, aserting lease terminated due 
to interruptions in production for brief periods in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1964, and 1969.)
